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rule (5)
approximations, transition
is no longer
00,
accurate. Define X41
x41 == oo
longer entirely
entirely accurate.
and
Xt E
where both
both sets are
and let x,
E X and
and Uu,t E
E U,
are
U, where
Simulation Method
Method
Data and Simulation
now discrete.
discrete. Then
Then the transition
transition is Z
z :X x U
->
~ X whose rule
rule is
Table 1 presents
for com,
presents policy parameters
corn,
parameters for
= xi
and wheat in 1987. Complete
z(Xt, u
Xi ~
Z(X t , U
E [Xi,
[Xi' Xi+1),
Xi+l),
cotton, rice, and
data (11)
(1 1)
Z(Xt,
u,)t ) =
->z(x,
ut)t ) E
Complete data
distributions of
on distributions
of base acreage
acreage for
for these crops
crops where
Xi is the
the ith
ith element of X. It
It is difficult
in 1987 were obtained
obtained from
from the U.S.
U.S. DepartDepart- where xi
farmer
up
for
a
farmer
to
build
base
because
he must
up
ment of
of Agriculture's
Agriculture's Agricultural
Agricultural Stabilization
Stabilization
plant
enough
acreage
attain
average,
not
to
attain
the
enough
plant
acreage
average,
and
Service. The data
and Conservation
Conservation Service.
data describe
describe only
minimal,
farm
size
any
category.
farm
in
any
category.
the state
and
of
farms
state and county
farms having base;
base; they
Since we did not have data
data on yields
yields for each
farm,
heterogeneity of farm
farm
farm, we modeled the heterogeneity
qualities by
by assuming
assuming that
that yields
yields follow indequalities
6
pendent symmetric
symmetric binomial distributions
distributions across
across
6 This is the accumulation of
of inventories by
by both private
private agents
agents
pendent
and
and the public sector. Although (9) is a description
description of
of market
market deacreage categories.
categories. Mean yields
yields for corn,
com,
base acreage
of inventories is used to maintain
maintain the loan
mand, the accumulation of
and
actual
and
wheat
were
set
at
actual
hiscotton,
rice,
rate
rate in the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program.
program. Farmers'
Farmers' expectations
expectations
about these stocks are captured
torical yields
yields from
from national
national data
data in 1987, and
and
torical
captured in expected
expected reward
reward function (4).
Table
Table 1.

Corn
Com
Cotton
Rice
Wheat

Market
Market Prices
Prices and Policy
Policy Parameters
Parameters in 1987
Market
Market
Price
(p)
(p)

Target
Target
Price

$1.94
$1.94
$0.64
$0.64
$7.27
$7.27
$2.57
$2.57

Diversion
Factor
Factor
(5)(y))

Diversion
Payments
Payments
( y)(O)

Program
Program
Yield

(('T)

Loan
Rate
(L)
(L)
(L)

$3.03
$3.03
$0.79
$0.79
$11.66
$11.66
$4.38
$4.38

$1.82
$1.82
$0.52
$0.52
$6.84
$6.84
$2.28
$2.28

0.314
0.314
0.286
0.286
0.392
0.392
0.312
0.312

$0.59
$0.59
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

104.0
104.0
593.0
593.0
46.8
46.8
35.0
35.0

(t/J)

Source: U.S.
U.S. Department of
of Agriculture, Historical
Historical Commodity
Commodity Data
Data Series: 1950-1987.
1950-1987.
Notes: Prices are dollars per bushel,
bushel, pound, or cwt.,
cwt., as relevant. Diversion
Diversion payments
payments are in dollars per
per bushel,
bushel, pound,
pound, or cwt. not planted.
planted.
per acre, as relevant.
Program yields
yields are in bushels,
bushels, pounds, or cwt. per

standard
deviations were calculated
from yields
standarddeviations
calculated from
yields
for
for 1980 through
1987.77
through 1987.
The
The cost function
function (2) was calibrated
calibratedusing
fixed
using fixed
and variable
per acre
and
variable costs per
acre in McElroy,
McElroy, Ali,
Dismukes, and
and Clauson.
Clauson. The quadratic
quadratic adjustadjustment
parameter a was the
ment parameter
the only
variable used to
only variable
fit actual
1987.. We assumed
actual data
data in 1987
assumed a was the
the
same
for both
both yields
and searched
searched for
for a value
same for
yields and
% of historical
predicting
within 11%
historical output.
predicting within
output. Adx
justment parameters
parameters were calibrated
calibrated at
at 1.5 X
justment
1
2
1
4
,
10,1.0
X
10and
5.9
x
10x
x
1.0
10-4
1.0 X 105.9
10-2,,1.0
10-',
10,
for
for com,
and wheat respectively.
corn, cotton, rice, and
respectively.
The interpretation
that farmers
farmers
interpretationof these values is that
must
pay the
the full economic cost of planting
and
must pay
planting and
a further
further penalty
penalty to
plant more
base acreage.
to plant
more than
than base
acreage.
For
planting ten
beyond base
base costs
ten acres
For example,
acres beyond
costs
example, planting
the analogous
for
a corn
corn farmer
farmer $2467; the
analogous costs for
cotton, rice, and
and wheat
wheat are
are $8591, $8198, and
and
$1161 respectively.
for wheat rererespectively. The low value for
marginal
land
into
flects the
land
into
the ease of bringing
bringing marginal
7
and wheat were
7 The mean yields
corn, cotton, rice, and
yields in 1987 for com,
standard
119.8,702,55.55,
and 39.8
39.8 respectively.
119.8, 702, 55.55, and
respectively. Their respective standard
units
and 2.1.
deviations were 13.2, 83.2,
2.1. Table 1 gives the units
83.2, 4.6,
4.6, and
for these data.
data.
and
and source for

Figure 1.

Low-yield
calibration
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anticipation of higher
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Data in
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The demand
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and foreign
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different domestic
domestic and
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foreign price
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and
and Dixit. Domestic demand
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international demand.
than international
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domestic production
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accumulation
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algorithm, we simfixed-point algorithm,
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For each p,
for each crop.
partial
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for the
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other for
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farm. Then
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other
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distributions of farm
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Then
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excess
demand.
Then
gorithm
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$.01, and
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run again.
Price p is an
an
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algorithm was run
again. Price
8
1.05 ' for
for all simulations, we achieve convergence
8 Setting f3
P == 1.05')
convergence
7
in the
the supremum
of 10norm on the
the order
order of
in
10-7, , corresponding
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corresponding to $.01
for $100,000
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for
the
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$100,000 in present-value
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Table 2.

Empirical
Findings
Empirical Findings
Using
first for
for
the calibrated
calibratedsupplies,
Using the
supplies, we solved first
equilibrium
American policy.
the current
currentAmerican
under the
policy.
equilibrium under
Then
the five other
other policies
Then we analyzed
policies deanalyzed the
scribed
and 5 abbreviate
abbreviatethese
these
Tables 3, 4, and
scribedabove.
above. Tables
six policies
The status
status quo
with subscripts.
quo sets
subscripts. The
policies with
0011 == (T,
where values
values of
of these
these pay, D,
q, L),
L), where
6, 0/,
(r, 1',
parameters
in
table
1.
The
second
polin
1.
table
rameters are
are given
polgiven
icy,
sets O
which eliminates
eliminates all
all subsidies, sets
022 = (0,
icy, which
0, 0, 0, 0) and
function
constrains the
the transition
transitionfunction
and constrains
= Xt.
to be z(x
what market
marketconThis shows what
z(xt,
xt. This
t, u
t) =
ut)
ditions
subsidies were
were abolished
abolished and
and
ditions would be if subsidies
operators
of
large
farms
had
permanently
high
farms
had
permanently high
operators large
fixed costs. The third
thirdpolicy,
freezes base
policy, which freezes
acreage,
and transition
transition
acreage, corresponds
corresponds to 0033 = 0011 and
rule
= Xt.
are part
rule z(Xl'
z(x,, uut)
t) =
x,. Since fixed costs are
part of
9
9 The equilibrium
and approximation
may not be unique,
equilibrium may
unique, and
approximation to it
can be wrong
as $.02.
the Gauss Programming
$.02. Using
wrong by
by as much as
Using the
Programming
Language,
minutes to conLanguage, each simulation took approximately
approximately two minutes
verge
on
a
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with
an
80286
chip
and
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an
and
math coverge
personal computer
chip
processor.

Data Used in Simulating
Functions
Demand Functions
Simulating the Demand
Domestic
Consumption
Consumption

Corn
Corn
Cotton
Rice
Wheat

equilibrium
durdemand changes
sign durchanges sign
equilibrium if excess demand
9
ing
iteration.9
current iteration.
the current
ing the

6.041
3.631
0.074
0.074
1.086
1.086

(Billions of Units, Except
the Demand Elasticities)
Elasticities)
Except for the
Domestic
Exports
Production
e
Production
Exports

-0.21
-0.21
-0.20
-0.20
-0.25
-0.25
-0.35
-0.35

8.877
8.877
6.948
6.948
0.130
0.130
2.108
2.108

1.716
3.045
3.045
0.072
0.072
1.598

e*
E*

-1.176
-1.176
-2.060
-2.060
-10.000
-10.000
-2.696
-2.696

Sources: The data
data for domestic consumption, net exports, and
and domestic production
production are
are given
given in U.S.
U.S. Department
Department of
of Agriculture,
Agriculture, Historical
Historical
1950-1987. Each demand elasticity is calculated as an arc
arc elasticity
elasticity from the simulations reported
reported in Roningen
Roningen
Commodity Data
Data Series: 1950-1987.
Commodity
and
and Dixit.
Dixit.

Table
Table 3.

Corn, low
Corn, high
Cotton, low
Cotton, high
Rice, low
Rice, high
Wheat, low
Wheat, high

Is Farming
Farming Profitable
Profitable Under
Under These
These Policies?
Policies?
8)
01

82
02

83
03

84
04

Y
Y
N
Y
y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
N

Y

85
05

86
06

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
N

Note:
Note: 01
8) is the
the simulated
simulated base
base case,
case, 02
82 abolishes
abolishes the
the subsidies,
subsidies, 03
83 freezes
freezes base
base acreage,
acreage, 04
84 halves
halves Producer
Producer Subsidy
Subsidy Equivalent,
Equivalent, 85
85 increases
increases
diversion
diversion payments,
payments, and
and 06
86 doubles
doubles the
the diversion
diversion requirement.
requirement.

Table 4.

The Effects
Effects of the Six Different
Different Policies
Policies
Price
(dollars)
(dollars)

Supply
Supply
(billions of units)
units)

Exports
Exports
(billions of units)
units)

Subsidies
(billions of dollars)
dollars)

1.94
1.92
2.00
2.00
2.36
2.36
2.00
2.00
1.84
2.00
2.00

8.9
8.7
8.9
8.5
10.1
7.1
9.1

1.7
1.5
1.8
1.6
3.0
-0.1
-0.1
1.9

7.4
5.4
5.4
0.0
2.4
1.5
6.9
2.6

Cotton, 1987 data
data
Cotton, (JI
01
Cotton, (J2
02
Cotton, 03
(J3
Cotton, (J4
04
Cotton, (J5
05
Cotton, (J6
06

0.64
0.64
0.62
0.62
0.52
0.52
0.58
0.58
0.62
0.62
0.62
0.62
0.66
0.66

6.9
7.0
7.0
8.7
7.4
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0

3.0
3.0
3.1
4.6
4.6
3.5
3.0
3.1
3.1

1.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.6
0.6
0.1

Rice, 1987 data
data
Rice, (JI
0,
Rice, (J2
02
Rice, (J3
03
Rice, (J4
04
Rice, (J5
05
Rice, (J6
06

7.27
7.27
7.23
6.83
7.25
7.13
7.31
7.25

0.13
0.13
0.13
0.19
0.19
0.13
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.13

0.07
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.13
0.07
0.07
0.09
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07

0.5
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.1

Wheat, 1987 data
data
Wheat, (JI
0,
Wheat, (J2
02
Wheat, (J3
03
Wheat, (J4
04
Wheat, (J5
05
Wheat, (J6
06

2.57
2.57
2.55
2.25
2.63
2.83
2.21
2.85

2.1
1.9
2.8
2.4
2.1
2.4
2.0

1.6
1.4
2.3
1.9
1.7
1.9
1.6

3.3
2.3
0.0
1.2
0.5
3.8
0.6
0.6

Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,
Corn,

1987 data
data
(JI
01
(J2
02
(J3
03
(J4
04
(J5
05
(J6
06

Data
Series: 1950-1987,
the other
Note: The
are from
Historical Commodity
Data Series:
policies are
the USDA's
and the
otherpolicies
fromthe
USDA's Historical
are as
as in
in table
Note:
The 1987
1987 data
dataare
table 3.
3.
1950-1987, and
Commodity

Table 5.

Corn
Corn
Cotton
Cotton
Rice
Wheat
Wheat

The Supply
Supply Shares of Large
Large Farms
(JI
01

(J2
02

(J3
03

(J4
04

(J5
05

(J6
06

17
17
52
72
36

29
54
69
56

24
63
74
65

21
21
52
67
53

20
52
73
28

20
48
65
54

Note: A large
farm is one with at
large farm
at least two hundred
hundred base acres,
acres,
and all numbers
numbers are
are percentages.
and
percentages. 001
simulated base case,
1 is the simulated
case, O
022
abolishes the subsidies, 0033 freezes base acreage,
Producer
acreage, 0044 halves Producer
payments, and
SUbsidy
and 0066 douSubsidy Equivalent, 005
5 increases diversion payments,
bles the diversion requirement.
requirement.

cost function
permanent penpenfunction (2), this
this imposes
imposes a permanent
alty
large farms
farms not covering
alty on large
covering average
average costs.
The fourth
fourth policy,
04 ==
policy, which halves PSE, is ()4
(7',
y/2,
5,
l/J,
L),
where
7'
=
(7
+
p)/2
andp
where
r'
and
(r', y/2, 6, ti,
(r p)/2
p
is price
price from
from the
fifth
the simulated
simulated base case. The fifth
(7, y',
y', 5, l/J,
policy is given
by ()s
where
L), where
05 == (r,
?, L),
policy
given by
=
y'
=
y
+
(7
p)/2
p is again
price
and p
the price
(r
y
Y'
p)/2 and
again the
from the
from
the simulated
scenario insimulated base case. This scenario

creases diversion
payments by
diversion payments
by half the ad valorem
farmers. The sixth
sixth case sets ()6
06
lorem subsidy
subsidy to farmers.
= (7,
=
25,
l/J,
L),
doubling
the
proportion
of
(, y,
y, 28, ?, L), doubling
proportion
land
must leave fallow to qualify
that farmers
farmers must
land that
qualify
for subsidies.
for
To understand
policies fully,
understand these policies
fully, it would
funcnecessary to graph
all
forty-eight
be necessary
graph forty-eight value functions. Table 3 provides
provides instead
instead a summary
summary of
the
policies' effects. Since (2) was calibrated
calibrated
the policies'
using
planting, value
the full economic cost of planting,
using the
rent. Hence
Hence
functions
pure economic
economic rent.
are farmers'
farmers'pure
functions are
accruthese functions
are the incremental
incremental value accrufunctions are
maintained base
ing
landowner who has
has maintained
ing to a landowner
acreage
planting proproan optimal
following an
optimal planting
acreage by
by following
for
gram.
For
example,
using
the
functions
for
com,
the
functions
For
corn,
example, using
gram.
we calculated
purchase of a low-yield
the purchase
that the
calculated that
low-yield
corn
acres base includes a precorn farm
farm with 340 acres
prethe price
per acre
price of
mium
acre above the
mium of about
about $145 per
farm
such
without base. A high-yield
corn farm
such land
land without
high-yield com
commands
premium of $405 per
an analogous
commands an
per
analogous premium
and each
acre.
policy and
for each policy
acre. Table
Table 3 indicates, for
are positive.
farm
premiums are
whether these premiums
farm type,
type, whether

"N"
an "N"
A "Y"
profitable program;
program; an
"Y" indicates
indicates a profitable
one.
shows an
an unprofitable
unprofitable
We draw
from table
table 3. First,
draw two conclusions from
First,
farming
unprofitable withfarming in America would be unprofitable
corroborates the genout subsidies. This finding
finding corroborates
reeral
residual reabout (negative)
eral conclusions about
(negative) residual
net
turns
and
risk,
net
of
government
and
turs to management
risk,
government
management
payments, reported
McElroy, Ali, Dismukes,
reported in McElroy,
payments,
and
policies reducing
and Clauson.
Clauson. Second, most policies
reducing
subsidies make
make low-yield
farms unprofitable.
low-yield farms
unprofitable.
Lowering
makes
Producer Subsidy
Subsidy Equivalent
Equivalent makes
Lowering Producer
for
the
premiums on low-yield
land
negative
for
each
land
each
the premiums
low-yield
negative
of the four
four crops.
crops.
for a lowFigure
surface for
Figure 2 shows the value surface
farm when subsidies are
yield
are abolished.
abolished.
corn farm
yield com
Contrasting
this
figure
figure
1
shows
how
with
figure
Contrasting
figure
the opnature of the
government
policy changes
changes the nature
government policy
vertical axis
axis
timal
planting program.
the vertical
Units on the
timal planting
program.Units
are
thousands of dollars
dollars of exhundreds of thousands
are now hundreds
and the surface
surface is
pected present-value
present-value losses, and
pected
are the same
truncated
at -$100,000.
truncated at
-$100,000. The axes are
as in figure
but now the
the surface
surface slopes
slopes down
figure 1, but
corn
along
large low-yield
low-yield corn
along the X axis because large
Farms with more
more
farms
are not remunerative.
remunerative. Farms
farms are
than
unprofitable bethan 160 acres
acres of base are
are quite
quite unprofitable
cause of their
sunk costs. The optimal
their high
optimal
high sunk

c
a)

a)
Q)

Figure 2.

Low-yield
subsidies
Low-yield corn farm, no subsidies

planting
program is simply
plant to capacity,
simply to plant
capacity,
planting program
minimizing
expected
losses.
minimizing expected
Table
presents the entire
entire array
simulation
Table 4 presents
arrayof simulation
results.
price, domestic supresults. It
It concentrates
concentrates on price,
supply, exports,
exports, and
policy
and total
total subsidies. These policy
ply,
simulations
simulations are
are valid, of course, only
only for the obpostuserved
and postuserved distributions
distributions of base acreage
acreage and
lated
farm yields
lated distribution
distribution of farm
1987; since
yields in 1987;
these distributions
distributions change only
only slowly,
slowly, the simfor the first
ulations are
for
first half of this
this deulations
are germane
germane
10
cade.
do
not
take
acThese summary
effects
take
cade.'0
summary
count
program
participation
rates,
nor
nor
count of subsidy
rates,
subsidy programparticipation
policies have
have
differentialeffects
effects policies
do they
the differential
they show the
on low-yield
farms or on small
and high-yield
high-yield farms
low-yield and
and
and large
farms. We discuss these effects belarge farms.
low.
Calibrations
partial equilibria
equilibria are
very
the partial
are all
all very
Calibrationsof the
good.
For all four
four crops,
matches the
the
good. For
crops, the model matches
historical
price, domestic supply,
for price,
historical data
data for
and
supply, and
exports.
predicts low particparticexports. Because the model predicts
10There has been an upward trend
10 There
upward trend in yields
yields for these crops.
crops. Since
program yields
farmers adopting
program
yields have been fixed for several years,
years, farmers
adopting
efficient technologies
participation less remunerative
find participation
remunerative as
technologies will find
time goes
about output
and exports
predictions about
goes by.
by. Therefore, our predictions
output and
exports
may
may be slightly
slightly conservative.

ipation
match subsidies
subsidies very
rates, it does not match
very
ipation rates,
well, consistently
predicting
deficiency
lower
deficiency
consistently predicting
payments than
parthan actually
occurred. Predicted
Predicted parpayments
actually occurred.
ticipation
calibrated equilibria
rates for
for the calibrated
equilibria were
ticipation rates
56%
for cotton, 75%
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